Logical Reasoning Questions for CLAT | QB Set 46

A closer look at beefing up Jammu’s counter-terror grid

For the last couple of years, the Jammu region has been in the news for all the wrong reasons, and more so over the last few months. Security forces have suffered irreparable losses in their pursuit of terrorists who are active – this includes freshly infiltrated cadres – and, as usual, backed by Pakistan.

One of the major factors that emerged as the attribute was the weakened counter-terrorism grid resulting from troops from the Jammu region being re-deployed on the Line of Actual Control (LAC), following the Galwan incident of June 2020. In order to tide over this particular challenge, additional troops, to include Special Forces teams, have been inducted in the region to fill the void. (This daily had a report on this, titled “Around 3,000 Army troops, 500 special forces inducted into Jammu Area”, July 19, 2024). Recently, news of Assam Rifles troops being inducted in the Jammu region to strengthen the counter-terror operations in the region has been reported by various news agencies, both electronic and print.

This daily had a report on this too – “CRPF to replace two battalions of Assam Rifles in Manipur; Kuki-Zo groups oppose the move”, August 1, 2024. The reports, obviously not covered by so many, highlight concerns on the part of the security agencies over the progressively deteriorating security scenario in the entire Jammu region, from Kathua in the south all the way to the northern borders. Besides the Jammu region, there are concerns regarding the overall deteriorating security situation in the rest of the new part of the Union territory as well as the several incursions being attempted by forces from outside the country.

Establishing a grid

An efficient counter-terrorism grid entails units and sub-units deployed and able to operate in dominate the likely vulnerable areas and have an intimate feel for the region. As the grid is established, the forces which make up the same should consider various factors such as terrain, vulnerable areas, and even inclination of the local population, i.e., whether the population is supportive or otherwise.

The sub-units, having been deployed as part of the grid, embark on the mission of hunting for terrorists by undertaking tactical operations based on psychological aspects such as people friendliness. The knowledge of the terrain and winning the hearts and the minds of the people form the basis of operations mentioned above. Given the nature of the tasks at hand, the entire process is well thought through, deliberate and time consuming. Sub-unit commanders gain the confidence of the people by their operational conduct so as to get the local population to tip the information on terrorists who may be active in the area.

The challenges

As per the classical teaching of counter-insurgency/counter-terrorism, the local population is seen divided into three sub-sets. A very small number support the state and security forces, respectively, and a majority are bystanders, neutral. The success of operations and establishing a grid are supported by the terrain, areas, numbers and the support and winning over two-thirds the local population.

The Indian Army has been undertaking a rotation (by re-shifting units, integrated with regular infantry or Rashtriya Rifles units), which supports the counter-infiltration deployment on the Line of Control. The chain of command remains robust and clear. However, the process of orienting the new inductees and winning over the local population is much more, and, most importantly, winning them over. It is much more than merely the mathematics of having an accretion.

These challenges, to a certain extent, could be mitigated if the newly inducted troops were superimposed on the already deployed units and sub-units rather than being deployed in a piecemeal manner. As far as possible, the new body of troops in an area should be deployed as sub-units under the respective leaders, and not in a piecemeal manner aimed at numerical increase.

Operation Dudhi

Lastly, vis-a-vis the Assam Rifles unit that is likely to be deployed, and as reported in recent media reports, it is not the first time that Assam Rifles units are being deployed in Jammu and Kashmir. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, Assam Rifles units were deployed in the Valley and had performed gallantly as integral units. The successful Operation Dudhi, in May 1991, in the general area of Chowkibal by 7 Assam Rifles is still remembered as one of the most successful operations.

Another aspect of Operation Dudhi was that this was mainly conducted under the commanding officer, and only within his sub-units playing a major role. The lessons still endure and are suitable for the current scenario – forces should be deployed as integrated bodies, not in a piecemeal manner.

However, due to the relatively decreasing number of counter-terrorism operations experience by Assam Rifles troops being shifted to the Valley in the present context, the challenge for them will be to rapidly orient and adapt in the area.

In a nutshell, an additional and well integrated counter-terrorism grid is the need of the hour, and the process of orientation of new troops and winning hearts and minds is a long haul, and expecting snap outcomes will be detrimental, in all respects.

Question -1) Which of the following reasons best explains the need for redeployment of troops from the Jammu region to the Line of Actual Control (LAC)?

A) Increased infiltration activities in the Jammu region.

B) The Galwan incident of June 2020.

C) The necessity to establish a stronger counter-terrorism grid.

D) The support from local populations in the Jammu region.

Question -2) What is the primary role of the newly inducted Special Forces teams and additional troops in the Jammu region?

A) To replace existing Assam Rifles units.

B) To strengthen the counter-terrorism grid.

C) To establish new military bases.

D) To conduct operations beyond the battalion level.

Question -3) According to the passage, which factor is NOT considered in establishing a counter-terrorism grid?

A) Terrain.

B) Vulnerable areas.

C) Inclination of the local population.

D) International diplomatic relations.

Question -4) Which of the following best describes the challenge faced by newly inducted troops in the Jammu region?

A) Lack of numerical strength.

B) Absence of a command structure.

C) Need to orient themselves and win over the local population.

D) Insufficient training in counter-terrorism operations.

Question -5) What lesson from Operation Dudhi is emphasized as important for current military operations?

A) The need for rapid deployment.

B) The importance of trusting commanding officers.

C) The significance of large-scale operations.

D) The necessity of piecemeal deployment.

Question -6) Which of the following best summarizes the author’s view on the deployment of additional troops in the Jammu region?

A) It is a short-term solution that will yield quick results.

B) It should be done in an independent manner to maximize effectiveness.

C) It should involve integrating new troops with existing units and allowing sufficient time for adaptation.

D) It will likely face strong opposition from local populations.