
The recent political development involving Raghav Chadha and six other Aam Aadmi Party (AAP) Rajya Sabha MPs joining the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) has triggered a serious constitutional debate. While the Rajya Sabha Chairman has approved the “merger,” the larger legal question remains—does this move qualify as a valid defence under India’s anti-defection law?
In April 2026, seven AAP Rajya Sabha MPs, including Chadha, formally joined the BJP. The Chairman of the Rajya Sabha recognised this as a merger under the Tenth Schedule of the Constitution. As a result, these MPs were not immediately disqualified, and the BJP’s strength in the Upper House increased significantly.
Chadha justified his decision by citing internal issues within AAP, including what he described as a “toxic work culture.” However, beyond political reasoning, the move raises a deeper legal issue under the anti-defection framework.
The anti-defection law, introduced through the 52nd Constitutional Amendment (1985) and strengthened by the 91st Amendment (2003), aims to prevent political defections and ensure party discipline.
Under Paragraph 2 of the Tenth Schedule, a member can be disqualified if they voluntarily give up party membership or defy the party whip.
However, there is an important exception—merger (Paragraph 4). For a valid merger:
Chadha and the other MPs rely on the second condition—they claim that since two-thirds of AAP’s Rajya Sabha MPs joined BJP, they are protected under the merger exception.
But this argument faces a major legal hurdle.
The first condition is not satisfied. The Aam Aadmi Party as a national political party has not merged with the BJP. Only a group of MPs has switched sides. This raises a fundamental question—can a legislative group act independently of the political party?
The answer largely lies in the Supreme Court’s interpretation in the Subhash Desai v. Principal Secretary, Governor of Maharashtra case (2023).
The Court clearly held:
The Court emphasised that a legislative majority does not equal the political party itself. This interpretation suggests that MPs alone cannot engineer a valid merger.
Despite the Supreme Court’s stance, there is some legal uncertainty. In certain earlier cases, including decisions of the Bombay High Court in Goa-related political disputes, courts have taken a more flexible view—accepting that a two-thirds legislative majority may be sufficient.
This creates a conflict in interpretation, making the law unsettled.
From a strict constitutional perspective, Chadha’s defence appears weak. Since AAP as a party has not merged with the BJP, the essential requirement under Paragraph 4 is missing.
However, because the Rajya Sabha Chairman has accepted the merger, the MPs currently retain their positions. The final word will likely come from the Supreme Court if the decision is challenged.
This controversy highlights a recurring issue in Indian politics—the potential misuse of the merger provision to bypass disqualification. It also raises concerns about:
Raghav Chadha’s move sits at the intersection of politics and constitutional law. While procedurally approved, its legal validity remains doubtful. Unless the Supreme Court endorses a broader interpretation of merger, this case may ultimately be treated as defection rather than a legitimate political realignment.
The outcome could significantly shape how India’s anti-defection law is interpreted in the future.